The architecture of the British Mandate in Iraq: nation-building and state creation

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This paper seeks to examine and contextualise the architecture and infrastructure projects developed by the British during the occupation of Iraq in the First World War and the Mandate period that immediately followed. Relying heavily on military-political events for its structure and underlying narrative, the paper demonstrates how architecture, planning and 'development' were integral to the act of creating the new state and were very much part of the colonisers' vision to create a nation in their own image. Works were deployed to imbue a sense of collective belonging and national identity through the creation of new town plans, as well as through institutions such as museums and universities. A certain dissonance emerges between the infrastructure and prestige projects, with the latter presenting an imagined and fabricated notion of Iraqi history, blended with a grandiose colonial style imported from India, and designed predominantly by James M. Wilson. The infrastructure projects began with sanitation improvements, road and rail installation, and expansion of the Basra docklands to attract international shipping and for the export of oil. Further building projects undertaken by the Public Works Department included a large number of administrative buildings called serais**. Built at strategic locations, they were deployed as multi-functional centres for justice, taxation and land registration as well as places where local devolved empowerment was instigated. Iraqi architecture from this period has been largely overlooked in the emerging global histories of architecture, yet it offers an important view of the quandaries that faced late British colonial architecture in its attempts to respond to, and reflect changing and hostile political conditions.**

Introduction

This paper seeks to investigate the architectural, planning and infrastructural work undertaken in the territory now known as Iraq.[1] Focussing upon the First World War, the ensuing British Mandate period and the somewhat murky quasi-colonial era leading up to the Second World War, the paper will consider how these projects were deployed in the process of state and nation building.[2] The creation of this state offers something of a unique insight into late colonialism, Britain's relationship with India and broader notions of nationhood. The political and military story has been well reported, but the expression of state and nation in the form of architecture, planning and infrastructure has yet to be woven into this narrative.[3]

The Mandate, itself a means of legitimising colonial occupation, set the parameters of Iraq's borders as well as the broader roles of government, such as the systems of taxation, landownership, and

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law and order, but these three strands of administration could not possibly function without a set of tangible modifications to the territory through architecture, engineering and infrastructure projects. Georg Simmel has described these kinds of works as the 'visible institutions of the state', the tangible expressions of power that somehow embody the spirit of an administration, whether intentionally or not.[4] But when the state does not exist, or is embryonic, highly contested and far from defined, these institutions are particularly symbolic, as well as vulnerable. It was through these devices that the British hoped to depart from what Mann describes as 'despotic power' towards an 'infrastructional power'.[5] These projects had the means to generate a 'positive relevance of the state to the everyday lives of its citizens', and were seen as fundamental to imbuing local tolerance towards state institutions and 'ultimately to the growth of state legitimacy'.[6]

While certain infrastructure might directly be of use to the average person (such as water supply or a road), other visible institutions of the state may be less so, or attempt to perform another more pervasive role as icons of the state. Talentino argues that 'function and identity' are the two faces of nation building, and in built terms these could be categorised as 'infrastructure' versus 'prestige' projects.[7] Whilst generally grandiose in scale and occupying important sites, the 'identity/prestige' projects must resonate with the indigenous population if they are not to become hollow stage sets, the mirage of power and solidity. Equally, these institutions might serve as a flamboyant distraction or decoy, whilst the more seemingly passive, low-lying yet pervading transport networks, services and administrative mechanisms go unno-

ticed. They form the conduits for governing and serve as the vectors and agencies of power. Without these seemingly rudimentary and banal projects (roads, canals, drainage, water supply, docks, railway, telegraphs, bond sheds, bridges) the larger institutions that represent the ideals of the state (the palaces, universities, port offices, museums, secretariat) would be less valid and virtually impossible to deliver and maintain.

Whilst presenting, not un-problematically, the 'coloniser's view', and relying exclusively on colonial repositories for its sources, the paper attempts to address the paucity of research undertaken into this region, and Iraq specifically, in the early part of the twentieth century. Sultani's *Architecture in Iraq between the Two World Wars* was one of the first articles to assemble a survey of architecture designed by British architects in Iraq, and set the scene for Crinson's broader analysis in *Modern Architecture and the End of Empire* as well as his earlier paper on the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company.[8] Pieri's *Baghdad Arts Deco: Architectural Brickwork, 1920–1950* offers an unrivalled catalogue of contemporary photographs of Baghdadi buildings, along with essays on James M. Wilson's work and later developments by Iraqi architects, attempting to demonstrate how the Mandate architecture was contributing to the 'Arab Renaissance' and utilising local craftsmen [*Ustas*].[9]

The book (and especially the interviews and essays by Iraqi architects) formed an important framework for *The Architecture of Modernity in Baghdad: From Le Corbusier to the Iraqi Pioneers* conference that took place in Iraq during April, 2013. Here the pantheon of well-publicised and triumphal Modernist projects in the 1950s was discussed, but the

Conference mainly positioned these works within the *oeuvre* of the architects in question, rather than as components of an emerging nation.[10] The Iraqi architect 'pioneers' in question included the eminent figures of Mohamed Saleh Makiya (1917–2015) and Ja'far Allawi (1915–2005), both of whom sought to rethink an architecture that would represent their nation and culture. Allawi's drawings have been carefully preserved and are a promising repository for future investigation.[11] Also in the post-war arena, Stanek reveals the period of Iraqi alignment with Eastern European and Soviet regimes that followed the 1958 revolution and overthrow of the Hashemite monarchy.[12]

This paper seeks to contribute to, as well as contextualise, this limited but growing collection of research by focussing primarily on the Public Works Department, and its relationship with the politico-military agenda in commissioning the structures and projects. In doing so it is hoped partially to address the deficit in 'global' architectural histories, and in particular the paucity of research undertaken into early twentieth-century Middle Eastern regions —not with the intention of forming a regional or geographical view of those works, but rather to explore the flows and networks that informed these buildings, plans and ideas, and to understand how they might have contributed to the ideas of nation, identity and political ambition in the twilight years of the British Empire.[13]

Early British encounters

Initially 'policing' its waters, the British established a factory in Basra in 1723, and by the 1740s the East India Company had exclusive British trading rights in Mesopotamia. By the turn of the century a self-styled embassy was built in a prime location on the banks of the Tigris in Baghdad in response to concerns over French ambitions in the wider region, and the increased risk to India this encroachment might pose.[14] The Residency, as it was known, was a plain palazzo-type building with a double loggia; it stood markedly separate from the high density and tightly arranged streets of the surrounding buildings, acting as a beacon of the East India Company's 'sphere of influence' (Fig. 1). Compared to India, the trade was insignificant, but this Mesopotamian foothold was an important 'short cut' to India,[15] processing the overland mail, and providing a secondary market for British wool and the spices and cotton of India.[16] Furthermore, Mesopotamia was a place enveloped in mystery and Orientalist intrigue for the British—it was seen as a portal to Old Testament narratives, and the popularity of the *Arabian Nights* stories contributed to an exotic allure.

The Ottoman regime freely granted concessions for trade, unwittingly permitting the tentacles of the British Empire to take hold, although beyond shipping, interest was limited to Christian Mission Society hospitals, street lighting ventures, an electric tram company and a Baghdadi cinema that opened in 1911.[17] In addition to trade there was also some exchange of expertise between the British and Ottomans. William Willcocks (1852–1932), for example, served as an advisor to the Turkish ministry of public works and produced a detailed survey and agricultural irrigation proposal for Mesopotamia in 1911.[18] But beyond these trade links it was French Imperial ambition that caused the British great

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Figure 1. The British
Residency on the banks
of the Tigris River
(image from *Country
Life*; March, 1917).

anxiety, as did the German proposals for the *Baghdadbahn*, that was to connect Berlin to Baghdad.[19] This fear was made all the more palpable once the discovery and potential of oil was realised, rapidly changing all perceptions of the region, and fermenting the political desire to retain control and access to it.[20]

Mesopotamia and the First World War

When the Turks sided with Germany in the First World War, Britain urgently needed to protect the Anglo Persian Oil Company assets and to ensure the Navy's oil supply.[21] With Britain concentrating on the war in Europe it was Delhi that sent the Indian Expeditionary Force D (IEFD) to capture the port of Basra in 1914, aided by Willcocks' accurate surveys of the region. It was a move that demonstrated India's own expansionist ambitions and desires for increased political and geographical control in the region, further cementing its cultural and political influence over the Gulf and East Africa.[22]

Even before the end of the war the British assumed that they would retain control of Basra, if not the wider territory, prompting the rapid appoint-

ment of Captain Samuel Douglas Meadows (1889–1941) of the Royal Engineers to prepare town improvement plans.[23] The *Architects' Journal* described his work as a 'proposed city of the future', a grid-iron street pattern laid out around the docklands, with a *beaux-arts* municipal centre and racially segregated housing (the 'native' area was not included in or modified by the plan), with most of the changes devoted to introducing railway provision to the docks and general improvements to the wharves and dock buildings: 'The prospect of bridges over the river, the termination of the Great Road in some imposing pile of masonry, the picturesque creeks ornamentally treated, the surrounding magnificence in artistic structures, should make an imposing climax'.[24]

Clearly the plan for Basra was not seen purely in terms of functional military efficiency, but also involved beautifying and enhancing the setting as a long-term investment. Indeed, the Great Road's vista was imagined as being comparable to the Champs Elysée or Unter den Linden. For whom was this work being undertaken, and why was it deemed necessary in a time of war and financial strain? Annexed to Britain, an extrapolated future vision was imagined with the river frontage occupied by 'Government officials, merchants, and leaders of industry and commerce', whilst on the right bank, 'at Gurmat Ali houses with, say, two or three acres, each for minor officials, professional men and business people'.[25] Perhaps it was war-time propaganda eliciting such prose, but clearly the ambition for large-scale building projects and civic investment was vividly conjured, and this activity suggested far more than protecting trade routes and oil conces-

sions. A further array of facilities were proposed, including 'baths, public wash-houses, libraries, laundries, schools, theatres, and churches' and the older existing settlements would be linked up with roads and railways to 'eventually either assume a European character or disappear altogether'.[26] This was not just a capture of the territory for trade, but a cultural eradication and the creation of a new town arranged on British-Indian lines, with houses possessing all the properties of an 'English house with the additional constructional requirements to exclude the sun and consequent heat'.[27]

These developments could not take place without first addressing some more fundamental concerns, namely the docks and the sanitation of the growing town. The British had very limited experience of Basra beyond the shore and sought to generate information through a systematic house-to-house survey and inspection in 1917: although not a full census it had the same objectives. It produced data for the colonisers and records were maintained of the findings in district registers used to inform future projects.[28] But more than this, it was also a 'tool of domination'[29] and a means of identity (if not nation) creation, by presenting local society back to itself and influencing the way Iraqis thought about themselves.[30] The large densely grouped camps were considered to pose great risk of disease. No doubt recent memories from India of plague fuelled colonial concern, and a rudimentary sanitation programme hastily commenced:

> 83 blocks of latrines were erected, and for every set of latrines an incinerator was built. The latrine receptacles were fashioned from

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disused kerosene tins—the liquids were disposed of in covered soakage pits, and the solids, after mixture with condemned cattle fodder or dried horse-litter, were burnt in the incinerators.[31]

As in India, the leftover ash was used for land reclamation of the marshy creeks, expanding the docklands and regulating the shoreline. Although there was a steady recruitment of military personnel, 'followers' and civil labour were in short supply, particularly for the lowly sanitation work. The regime addressed this through the importation of 'the Indian sweeper caste' to perform these essential duties.[32] Basra was rapidly being organised and administered as an Indian province, much to Iraqi disdain. In a Parliamentary debate as early as 1915 calls for Mesopotamia to become a British Colony were cheered and it was claimed that:

> India is the only country in the world that could really carry out the grand schemes of irrigation which have been planned by that great engineer, Sir William Willcocks, and I hope the day may soon come when we shall see this prosperous Colony become again the granary of the world and the Garden of Eden, as it was once before.[33]

The state being built, or rather extended here, was India, which was not seen as a fixed geographical or political entity. Rather, its porous edges and feathered boundaries enabled the envelopment of neighbouring and convenient 'vacant teritory'. Extending state boundaries might be easily accomplished, but far more was involved in developing a nation and was to be addressed through the importation of an Indian population. It was per-

ceived as a place for Indian emigrants acclimatised to Empire to occupy new land, or to have 'a clean sheet', as it was described.[34] The Indian population was, of course, utilised as a resource to be deployed where the war effort, and eventually the imperial agenda, demanded it. Without this reservoir of Indian labour the occupation and subsequent 'development' of Iraq would have been impossible. It was viewed as a potential utopia by the Civil Commissioner Arnold Wilson who dreamed of seeing Iraqi towns 'populated and cultivated by flourishing Indian colonies transported from the banks of the Indus'.[35] By the end of the war the government employed some '25,000 Indian labourers on military works, a further 10,000 on irrigation projects and 20,000 on the railways',[36] many of whom were conscripted convict labour cores, whilst additional labour was also drawn from Turkish prisoners of war (Fig. 2).[37] But this is jumping the gun slightly, as the British had yet to define the boundaries of the territory, and remained by the coast.

The lure Of Baghdad

Not content to remain in Basra, the IEFD pushed north and, meeting limited resistance, made considerable advances, outrunning its supplies and medical assistance in the process. It was 'considerations of prestige and the lure of Baghdad that beckoned the Army onward in spite of all orthodox military considerations', a move that was to prove disastrous. The Secretary of State for India authorised the mission, no doubt wanting to flaunt India's own imperial might. After all, 'Mesopotamia

Figure 2. Indian Convict
Core boarding ships at
Bombay ready for
departure to Basra (©
The British Library
Board; image reference
380/6(0)).

was India's war, India's frontier, and with any luck, India's reward.'[38]

It was also imagined that there was an 'organic connection' between the two places: 'Bombay is felt, throughout Iraq, to be the nearest important centre of commerce and civilization, and before the war the inhabitants of Basra used to regard Bombay and Baghdad as equidistant'.[39] At least this was the message the British wanted to convey, but even if true it reveals much about the arbitrary nature of the Sykes-Picot slicing up of the territory into neat parcels for Anglo-Franco consumption rather than on the basis of existing affinities and networks.[40] Furthermore, Indian nationalists also sup-

ported expansion into Iraq, claiming that if India was capable of occupying and administering a foreign territory, then surely it too could also become independent from its own colonial yoke.

As they progressed into the hinterland, the British were susceptible to Arab tribal attack from behind the front line and were exceptionally vulnerable as a result (many of the Arabs did not share the British view that they were being liberated from Ottoman rule). They eventually met substantial opposition from Turkish forces and were forced to retreat to Kut, where, besieged for four months, and with the loss of 20,000 lives and several failed rescue attempts, they eventually surrendered.[41]

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This series of events had several repercussions. The Indian administration was firmly blamed for the failed mission, and it was quickly realised that maintaining a fighting front and supply line hundreds of miles from the coast, whilst facing frequent and sporadic tribal attack, was not an easy position to maintain or even defend. If territory beyond Basra was to be captured, rapid improvements were needed to the infrastructure of the territory, starting with the port, condemned as:

> primitive, quarantine and customs provision inept, vexatious, and venal. No wharves, cranes or sheds or other port equipment were provided; loading and discharging overside to and from lighters in midstream were slow and costly operations.[42]

Once unloaded there was no storage or means to rapidly relay the cargoes onwards. Roads were poor and often impassable, and the river passage had to rely on small local vessels travelling a winding and tortuous route, coupled with the palpable risk of ambush.

An engineer from India, George Buchanan (1865–1940), was recruited to propose how the port might be developed,

> At the end of my inspection of the base I came to the conclusion that I had never before in my life seen such a hopeless mess and muddle, and I wondered if it were the usual accompaniment of war. It seemed to me incredible that we should have been in occupation of Basra for over a year, so very little had been done in that time towards the improvement of the base and the organisation of the port.[43]

Despite this, he felt that it had the makings of a substantial enterprise, one that would meet all of the shipping, storage and logistical needs of the region: 'with the advent of peace and a progressive administration, Basra will in the near future become the great port of the Middle East',[44] and, looking beyond the immediate military requirements: 'as the industrial development of India progresses … India will find in Mesopotamia and Persia a ready market for her surplus manufactured goods'.[45]

Buchanan boasted of recruiting two of his 'best Rangoon engineers', and also brought over Indian Public Works Department staff to conduct surveys. The port contract was awarded to a 'Chinese contractor engaged in Bombay' who built the 'the new deep-water wharf for ocean steamers, and the pontoons and bridge-work for floating pontoon landing-stages was coming up from Bombay in driblets'.[46] Further materials and dredgers were imported from India, and to relieve congestion at Basra a new quay was developed upstream at Ma'qil. The preferred method of colonial development was to utilise machines and manufactured goods produced in Britain to offset the trade deficits of imported raw materials, but here the Empire (or rather, specifically India and Burma) was generating its own internal market, expertise and supply networks bypassing the Metropolis. Labour and all materials had to be imported, including Teak hardwood from Rangoon used to form the wharves: '[A]lthough expensive, it would last almost indefinitely and be procured in less time than steel piles and girders which would have to be imported from England.'[47]

A map of Basra produced in 1918 shows the extent of the building works and how the British were attempting to make themselves at home using familiar place names, including Piccadilly Circus, Old Kent Road, Oxford Street and Jaipur Road, thereby dismissing local names, histories and memories (Fig. 3). The wharves at Ma'qil, each with a railway line, had been constructed along with the demarcation of various camps, stores, veterinary depots, hospitals for all classes and two British cemeteries. Ma'qil offered the chance to plan a new settlement and military presence without having to contend with the existing layouts of Ashar and Basra. Near to the new wharves a porters' corps settlement and 'rest camps' for new arrivals had been laid out. A new barge construction depot was also formed to fabricate suitable river craft to navigate the Shat Al Arab, and to deliver troops and supplies upstream. The entire enterprise set about the mechanisation and coordination of logistics not only for military expediency but also as a commercial civilian port and associated town under British directorship. The vast tracts of 'open land' could be commandeered and used as seen fit for the reformation of an Edenic paradise lost,[48] or, in this case, the creation of a city 'in the image of the leading military power'.[49]

Despite India's ambition to govern and envelop the territory, the failed Baghdad mission and the disaster of Kut limited India's future involvement beyond supplying labour and expertise. Frederick Stanley Maude took over the campaign and, with the arrival of fresh troops and supplies, eventually entered Baghdad in March, 1917. *Country Life*

offered rapid reportage to an eager readership with an article on 'The conquest of Baghdad'.[50] Vivid descriptions of the city were offered along with provocative photographs of curiosities such as the 'bridge of boats'. This was an attempt to normalise and develop British familiarity with the territory. *The Architect* also followed, including a detailed description of the major mosques and tombs of the city:

> One's first impression of a Mesopotamian town is not a very favourable one. This is partly accounted for by the signs of neglect and decay which meet the eye at every turn, and by the fact that to enter almost any town it is necessary to pick one's way through the innumerable graveyards and refuse-heaps.[51]

It was also acknowledged that 'once in the narrow streets, however, there is much of interest to be seen'.[52] The repulsion and shock of the 'other' was countered with an equal intrigue. The architectural press was subtly making the case for British intervention, even if only through the profane act of 'cleaning up the place' and restoring some of the historical splendour. The articles presented a well-rehearsed description of colonial prejudice coupled with a fascination for the exotic and technological adaptations to the extreme conditions (including a description of how dampened coconut fibre was used to cool interiors).[53] Whilst offering a seemingly benign picture they formed part of a wider enterprise of building 'home' support for British presence in the region, focussing the public gaze upon the exotic rather than on the brutal fighting and implications of occupation.

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Figure 3. Map of Basra
development from
1918 (The National
Archives, MPK 1/449).

As in Basra, and despite the fact that European settlement was 'out of the question',[54] a town plan was prepared for a 'New Baghdad' shortly after its capture using a similar tactic of retaining the existing city whilst developing a new settlement alongside it, composed of distinct civil and military zones (Fig. 4).[55] The proposal also included railway modifications and extensions including a designated passenger railway and series of associated workshop areas on the west bank of the Tigris. It was indebted to New Delhi, with new road layouts installed to connect existing routes and nodes whilst 'miles of modern official residences, public buildings, bungalows, churches, schools, parks, boulevards and business houses, added to a kind of glorified Aldershot and Woolwich, were to cover the desert'.[56]

Pragmatically, the railway lines define the outer limits of the town and as the plan moves away from the existing settlements it eventually yields to a grid pattern. The plan does not appear to have been fully executed ('fortunately the strong arm of economy smothered the grandiose scheme in time'),[57] but the principles behind it were certainly applied, with the southern parts of Baghdad developed as exclusive suburbs, socially transforming the area with its new type of gridded urban space. The grid permitted easier installation of sanitary devices, helped the regulation of land value and facilitated military supervision.

Whilst the development of these new town plans can be seen as part of the infrastructural power deployed by the British, they failed to cement any allegiance in the local population. Furthermore there was a growing movement in the UK questioning British involvement and associated financial implications.[58] Despite Buchanan's participation he was not in favour of prolonged British presence in Iraq, and in a series of four letters to *The Times* bemoaned the town developments as 'an orgy of waste' and war-time extravagance, questioning the necessity of large-scale development:

> there must be an end to the ordering of towns to be built and lighted by electricity regardless of expense, the building of solid concrete roads, every ounce of cement and of stone being imported from India, and the carrying out of other large public works without estimates properly drawn up by men competent to do so. Any fool can do marvels in the way of engineering and architecture when money is no object. It is in doing work efficiently and economically that skill is required.[59]

Buchanan's views carried considerable backing, whereas others such as Arnold Wilson were still pursuing an Imperial agenda that sought to retain control with minimum Arab involvement. Wilson saw a (perceived) duty in creating a new nation that went beyond establishing a government and extended into other projects that would also subsidise British interests:

> … without law and order and communications and some measure of Western civilization the population cannot increase much beyond its present limit, which is all that the country will sustain in a state of disorder, without an organized Government, without canals, railways, hospitals, etc. To provide these is our duty … it would have been relatively easy to do so before the war ended, but now it is difficult[60]

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Figure 4. Map of New Baghdad showing Civil, Military and Railway proposals (The National Archives, CO1047/466).

Military rule was quickly transferred to a civil government shortly after the capture of Baghdad and from 1920 a British High Commissioner was appointed to Iraq, Sir Percy Cox, bringing an end to a productive period of convict and prisoner-of-war labour. The British argued that their extensive programme of works in 'draining, in building embankments, and wharfs, and in constructing railroads … ' [61] justified their presence in the region and that the League of Nations Mandate for Iraq should be awarded to them. Furthermore, and rather spuriously, they again professed that 'British India needs an outlet for its swarming millions and has in its surplus Moslem peoples a suitable source of settlers' who

could emigrate to Iraq.[62] The lack of available labour in Iraq was problematic on several fronts, not least in limiting demand for goods. But it also restricted the scale of agricultural development that was possible in the fertile regions once irrigation schemes were completed.

Creation of the Public Works Department

A formalised government made up of Iraqis with senior members of the Indian Civil Service as advisors, each heading up a government section, including a Public Works Department (PWD), was installed. Major-General E. H. Atkinson was PWD Secretary, responsible for Railways, the Port of Basra, Irrigations, Public Works and Communication—but he only stayed in post for 'a few months',[63] and India was looked to again for personnel. In May, 1920, a letter was sent to the Treasury from the India Office: 'I am directed by the Secretary of State for India … to propose a reorganization for a military and public works directorate.' It was noted that 'the attention of Colonel Wilson has been drawn to the new [salary] scale' which enticed him to accept the post (Fig. 5).[64]

James Molliston Wilson (1887–1965) had accompanied Edwin Lutyens to India, working as an assistant on the New Delhi scheme.[65] He was in India at the outbreak of the First World War and served in the Punjab Light Horse Regiment, was posted to Mesopotamia, and subsequently promoted in the Indian Engineers, 'because there were so few officers with building experience in the Expeditionary Force'.[66] He set about creating a new department structure as well as spending considerable time on site, inspecting projects and

roads, and helping with Gertrude Bell's archaeological digs.[67]

Founded in India in 1855, the PWD was an established component of the Empire, largely providing three building types considered essential bases (or scaffolds) for government: post and telegraph offices (communication); police stations and prisons (law and order); hospitals (healthcare provision).[68] In addition, and by far the largest initial enterprise in Iraq, was the seemingly innocent business of road building. Without efficient transport links it was not possible to govern the country, but more than this they formed a unifying network, connecting communities and towns that were previously remote, shortening travel distances and enhancing exchanges between the diverse groups and tribes of the territory. As Satia explains, it was the road as a technological innovation that 'would produce Mesopotamia itself as a geographical and political object'.[69] The lack of stone in the region coupled with the large distances to be metalled resulted in a laborious and trying process, 'in short, in Iraq road-building is bridge-building and little else'.[70] Whilst the road building may have paved the geo-political boundaries it did not distil a sense of 'myth and artefact, fiction or spatial metaphor' for the Iraqis—other than in practical terms aiding their resistance movements against the Mandate.[71]

In addition to transport, the PWD developed other education and health construction works including:

> about a dozen good new school buildings, three hospitals, of which the Maude Memorial Hospital at Basra is a noble example, and five systems of water-supply for Baghdad, Basra,

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Figure 5. Iraq PWD
photograph:
J. M. Wilson is sixth
from the left, first row
seated, and H. Mason is
seventh from the left,
first row seated
(courtesy of Wilson
Mason LLP).

Mosul, Arbil and Nasiriya. The water-supply and electric lighting systems have been built at the expense of municipal funds.[72]

Through these projects we see a more overt attempt at expressing a collective identity through tangible works. The Maude memorial hospital in Basra adopted the well-rehearsed PWD style, so recognisable and familiar from India that it must have helped to comfort some of its inmates (who were all European, of course; Fig. 6). In a similar idiom, but of far greater importance to the nation-building project, a Museum was established

to house the archaeological artefacts unearthed by Bell. The museum is an important building type, used as means to construct, order, curate and assemble a particular history, as defined by the colonisers. Through the systematic arrangement of objects it was being used to formulate an identity and perpetuate certain myths, and as Dodge discusses, it was an external intervention that 'that tries to legitimate itself in terms of the betterment of the population'.[73] The attachment of the colonisers to antiquity rather than to conquest attempted to form 'alternative legitimacies', with

the British as custodians of local practice, and to shape the manner in which Iraqis thought about themselves.[74]

Wilson also planned a small campus for Al Il Beit College, around a central formal garden lined both sides with faculty buildings leading down to the residences by the river and terminating with a 'Grand Edifice' hall. Again, in a similar vein to the Museum, the creation of a University was an attempt to vindicate the occupation, as well as providing an institution that would model British modes of education for the preparation of future leaders and administrators. Only the Theological Faculty building appears to have been constructed, built in the standard squat symmetrical formation with ready-made sash windows imported from the UK. Of greater significance are the decorative brick elements that borrow from 'Abbasid' orna-

mentation, whilst the wall details 'echo the Mustansiriya school' from the thirteenth century (figs 7, 8).[75]

Wilson was keen to utilise local materials and decorative historical references, hoping to 'evolve an Arabic renaissance in the arts',[76] and, as Pieri notes, 'the realization and a great part of the decoration were freely entrusted to the *Ustas*, the master builders'.[77] Through the narrative and creation of institutions, collections and exhibitions, it was hoped a collective (albeit Arab-centred) identity could be fostered, built on British notions of a nation state. Venturing beyond the mere pragmatic PWD work, the British hoped to instigate 'a meaningful presence in peoples' lives', and to develop an enabling platform so that 'the second, longer-term aspect of successful intervention can be enacted: nation building'.[78]

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Figure 7. Al Il Beit
University, masterplan
(The National Archives,
MPG 1/1207).

Figure 8. Al Il Beit
Theological College
Building, 1927
(*Architect & Building
News*, June, 1927).

The Serai

However, no such projects could obviate the opposition to the Mandate. Following mass revolt it was quickly replaced (or rather rebranded) with a new monarchy in 1921, with Faisal Ibn Husayn as King.[79] Hand-picked by the British, he was deemed an ideal candidate, having been expelled from neighbouring Syria by the French for 'anti-French activities'.[80] The territory subsequently became known as the Kingdom of Iraq under British Administration. The installation of King Faisal, along with Iraqi ministers (still answerable to British 'advisors' and with the British military providing all security) did little to appease the general population. Furthermore, 'Iraq', as identified in the Sykes-Picot agreement, was not a unified homogeneous territory but was made up of several minority groups (such as the Kurds) who did not agree with Faisal's appointment and abstained from the pseudo-referendum that brought him to 'power'.

Unperturbed, the PWD continued its substantial building programme, including new hospitals, schools, prisons and 'civil list' properties, as well as customs buildings and post offices—but by far the largest expenditure was on *Serais* (loosely translated as 'palace', from the Turkish *Seraglio*). These buildings functioned as self-contained administrative centres out of which districts could be governed. They frequently included courtrooms, police offices, PWD offices, cashiers, clerks, storerooms and touring officer's quarters. Taxes could be collected and spent, justice administered, new plans agreed, proposed and materials dispensed, and every transaction therein carefully noted, recorded and dispatched: all under one roof. Serais were, of course, already present in the major cities (along with the established caravan-serai system that extended throughout the wider region), but a new constellation was constructed in the early 1920s at strategic sites, generally on the major transport routes between the larger settlements (Fig. 9).[81] Ramadi and Rutba served as gateways to Iraq as well as desert resting points. A cluster of serais was built on the major roads equidistant from Baghdad and Basra, in a region rife with civil unrest, and further north, to the east of Kirkuk, a set of structures were built to appease the Kurdish presence, centred on Sulimaniyah.

A standardised uniform design was not deployed: instead, serais were designed specifically to suit the needs, size and political circumstances of their location. Some of these structures were substantial town hall-type buildings with grand civic architecture; others were more humble almost domestic-scale outposts, whilst in volatile areas they were fortified with machine-gun bastions and contained large interior courtyards for stables and police camels. The touring officer responsible for a particular region would visit each serai using it as an office and residence for the duration of his stay. It was a model clearly based on the Indian Civil Station and *Sadar* town.[82] The smaller serais resembled the *Dak* bungalows of India. Termed 'Blockhouses' in Iraq, they were basic walled compounds containing a lookout post/bastion, stables, barrack room and touring officer quarters.[83]

It was hoped that, by the mid-1930s, enough oil would be extracted to warrant a pipeline running

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Figure 9. Map of Iraq
showing serai locations
(drawn by the Author).

direct to the Mediterranean, and 'there will almost certainly be a railway from a Mediterranean port alongside the pipeline'.[84] This prompted the production of the serais along the main desert route

to Syria. The larger intention was to create a railway system that would connect the Mediterranean with Basra, and even beyond, to the Indian Nushki Line so that:

Figure 10. Map of Iraq
showing road networks,
1926 (The National
Archives, FO925/
41365).

the whole passenger traffic between Europe and Persia and India, avoiding the Suez Canal and the dreary passage over the Red Sea and Indian Ocean will then pour through Baghdad. It will have the choice of railways and airways. For already a project is almost complete for a subsidized civil air transport company to carry mails and passengers from Egypt to India across Iraq.[85]

Oil could be transported back to the Mediterranean, whilst passengers and exports from Europe could pass through onwards to India.

In order to realise this, the desert crossing had to be surveyed and mapped, and tracks maintained. Even as late as 1926 the road map included rather vague navigational signposts such as 'derelict Ford car' and 'pile of stones' as visual landmarks to aid the desert crossing, such was its reputation for disorientating travellers (Fig. 10). A decade into British occupation and the territory was still unfamiliar: beyond the towns and walls of the serai there was an administrative void and vacuum of unknowns. Satia discusses how 'visual signalling was almost useless and ranging difficult … the country remained unmapped for much of the war, largely because British surveyors found it impossible to map'.[86] Once arduously surveyed, the territory required protecting and monitoring, and the post at Ramadi was therefore particularly important. Located on the Euphrates River, and nestled between Lakes Therthar and Habbaniyah, all roads from the west leading to Baghdad converge on the town making it a key gateway to Baghdad, just 65 miles away (Fig. 11).[87]

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Figure 11. Ramadi Serai plan; redrawn by the Author from Iraq Administrative Report of the Public Works Department, 1928.

Indeed, it served as an 'entry point' into Iraq itself as only desert and small settlements lay to its west. The Serai was built over the road, forcing all travellers to pass through it and to present their passports. A customs office was also incorporated along with a bond shed where goods could be detained until duty had been settled. On the opposite flank of the building was a hospital and quarantine station. Resembling a small prison, travellers suspected of carrying contagious disease would be detained and held in the walled isolation yard, or European staff struck with fever whilst working in the deserts could receive treatment. The Serai served as an international frontier, checkpoint and triumphal gateway to Baghdad, ensuring that tax was collected and disease prevented from entering the capital.

Further west from Ramadi across the desert road towards Syria was the outpost of Rutba. An isolated and vulnerable structure it offered shelter and sleeping quarters to the British travelling to and from the Mediterranean. Designed to be self-sufficient it had its own well, expansive stores as well as dormitories, bedrooms, dining rooms and a 'ladies' sitting room' along with wireless radio masts and a substantial yard for the police camels (Fig. 12). As well as making the desert crossing safer for Europeans it was used to monitor the Syrian border (both physically and through telecommunications) and to

Figure 12. Rutba Serai plan; redrawn by the Author from Iraq Administrative Report of the Public Works Department, 1928.

provide advance warnings of attack or large convoys of goods approaching Baghdad.

Such serais enabled safe desert crossing and oil-pipe construction, whereas others were focussed on law and order. A major 'tribal revolt' [*thawra*] in response to the Mandate commenced at Rumaytha in 1920 and prompted the building of serais not only in that town, but also at the neighbouring Afak, Mishkab and Shamiyah to impress British control upon the dissenters, as well as to provide essential defences and supply hoards on the journey between Baghdad and Basra (Fig. 13). Retaining power over this fertile region was essential if Britain was to fulfil its desire for bountiful agricultural production.[88] The serais there consisted of large compounds with stables, mounted police and courts, as well as the usual touring officer accommodation and tax revenue collection offices. The build-

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
Figure 13. Rumaytha
Serai plan; redrawn by
the Author from Iraq
Administrative Report
of the Public Works
Department, 1928.

	Stables	
	Stables Yard	
Fodder		Fodder
	Men's Latrine Ablution	Kitchen
Mounted Police		Food Store
Mounted Police		Foot Police
Mounted Chawush		Foot Chawush
Mounted Police		Foot Police
Mounted Police		Foot Police

Verandah   Store   Strong Rm   Verandah

Mounted Police   Mounted Police   Mounted Police   Armoury   Guard   Lock up   Post and Telegraphs

Main
Entrance

10m   20m   30m   40m

ings were symbols of British presence and deterrents rather than cantonments or large military stations.

Mosul was a late acquisition for the Iraqi state, being captured from the Turks post-Armistice and initially awarded to the French Mandate. Following negotiations the British argued that a cohesive state could not be delivered, nor the borders effectively protected, if the northern *villayet* was not contained within Iraq—and there was also the strong prospect of oil being discovered in the region. The main population group here was the Kurds and a string of serais were constructed centred upon Sulaymaniah to appease the Kurdish population, resolutely opposed to the creation of Iraq and resistant to Arab governance from Kirkuk and Kifri (figs 14, 15). Eventually Kurds replaced Arab and Turkish officials 'giving rise to a wave of contentment and the hopes of political self-determination'.[89] These were false prospects and despite the creation of grand serais and trickles of devolution, the region and its people were subsumed into the wider vision of a single and united state.[90]

Although a physical expression of the British presence, the serais were not capable of providing all of the security and policing for the territory—if anything they occupied a ceremonial role in this regard and instead it was the British Royal Air Force (RAF) that provided military domination through frequent, and not altogether indiscriminate, punitive bombing raids. This choice of control further detached the state from society,[91] placing even greater importance on the serais and their potential to offer more congenial outreach to the population. Certain Ottoman procedures and offices were incorporated, such as the *Mudir-al-Mal* [accounts and tax

collector], *Tapu Mamur* [land registry office] and the *Mudir* [local governor], resulting in a kind of 'indirect rule', with the Iraqis taking a greater role in the implementation of (British) governmental and administrative procedures.

Despite the likelihood of recouping the expenditure on these high-profile projects, and their role in encouraging greater Iraqi 'participation', a government report outlining a number of financial cuts was published in 1925.[92] Gertrude Bell relayed the news to her father:

> There are several drastic cuts, one being in the Dept of Public Works, and this, though it's reasonable (you can't have public works without the money to pay for them) will I fear affect J.M. [Wilson] a good deal. It will mean marking time for several years and I am not sure that he will stay.[93]

Indeed, public works ceased (as did investment in irrigation, education and agriculture)[94] and, whilst considered a worthwhile investment, the money was not there to spend: 'there is no choice but that fresh public works should be postponed until the necessary means are provided by an increase in revenue, or a reduction in expenditure … '[95]

Bell's speculation proved true, and Wilson felt, 'that he could not take responsibility for the Department at the reduced strength and he decided to leave'.[96] A civil engineer, A. S Clay, replaced him, with Harold C. Mason as 'Government Architect and Executive Engineer (Buildings)'.[97] The rest of the Department was made up of Executive Engineers (one for each region of the country) who were in charge of teams of Assistant and Sub-Engineers.[98] Besides Mason, one of the Assistant Engineers was

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Figure 14. Sulaymaniah
Serai plan; redrawn by
the Author from Iraq
Administrative Report
of the Public Works
Department, 1928.

Store | Store | Store | Fuel | Prisoner Waiting Room | Prisoner Waiting Room | Prisoner Waiting Room

Back Yard

Police Office

Police Office | Police Office | Police Office | Judge | Court

Police Office

Police Office

Judicial Files

Police

Police Office

Lavs | coffee

Tapu Store

Store

Cashier | Guard | Tapu Clerks | Tapu Mamur | Qazis Clerks

PWD Office

Verandah | Qazis Room

Main Entrance

10m   20m   30m   40m

Figure 15. Penjwen
Serai plan; redrawn by
the Author from Iraq
Administrative Report
of the Public Works
Department, 1928.

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an architect, Richard Jeffrey Carter (1901–1940).[99]
The Department was organised into a buildings
and engineering projects team, and a roads team,
spread across three offices located in Basra,
Baghdad and Mosul. Each office was managed by
an executive engineer and the region further
divided into smaller 'sub-divisions'. In a Report it
was stressed that:

> every effort has been made to keep the plan-
> ning and construction on the most simple
> lines. Elevations of buildings have been
> treated as simply as possible, and architectural
> features and embellishments have been
> reduced to a minimum, the majority of the
> works having to rely for their effect on simple
> lines, general massing and grouping and
> good proportions.[100]

Architecture was therefore not decorative or sym-
bolic, its message was one of bland functionalism
and was devoid of any historical reference such as
Wilson had previously incorporated. Explaining the
budget reductions and justifying the sombre
nature of their designs, staff defended the buildings'
ability to withstand the harsh conditions:

> This has had the effect of making the newer
> buildings still plainer in appearance … at the
> same time it should not be overlooked that,
> with well proportioned fenestration, consider-
> able effect can be obtained from a blank wall
> treated properly.[101]

The Report included considerable detail on the
methodology of designing a building in the Iraqi
climate, such detailed defence suggesting this was
not always a high priority, but more than this
the Report formed a repository of know-how, a

document that would inform the work of others
working in similar climates, or attempting to
achieve similar results elsewhere in the Empire.[102]
It was also an apologia for the retention of the
Department and a pedestal for their prolificacy.
Clay showed little restraint in his commentary and
lambasted the treatment of his Department:

> Progress would have been steady had it not
> been for the measures of 1925, resulting
> from the report of the Financial Mission,
> which broke the organisation, dispersed a
> trained staff and sold off the plant and equip-
> ment. The increased expenditure of the years
> immediately following had to be tackled with
> improvised organisation, and considerable
> credit is due to all ranks that even a measure
> of efficiency was maintained.[103]

The plight of the PWD illustrates the broader con-
ditions in which the nation was being formed. The
British were not prepared to finance a military pres-
ence on the ground, preferring instead to rely on the
RAF, which considerably increased Iraqi resentment
towards them. Furthermore they were barely cover-
ing their international guarantees to turn Iraq 'into a
modern, self-determining state'.[104] Whilst the some-
what drab architecture may have damaged confi-
dence and highlighted broader issues, the failure
to maintain and develop roads, water supply and
new serais seriously undermined the scope for
nation and identity formation that included British
involvement.

The cuts were part of a political agenda to
appease Parliament by troop withdrawal and
reduction of British financial exposure. In effect,
the restraints were short lived and when oil was dis-

covered in Kirkuk in 1927 further transport networks were required, including building a pipeline to Tripoli (Lebanon) and another to Haifa, covering over 1100 miles and requiring twelve pumping stations. A train line was planned to accompany the pipe and by 1930 eighty British engineers had arrived from India to work on this project as well as on the Baghdad-Haifa railway.[105] The Department stepped up its road building exploits, constructing 3,000 miles of roads across the country, numerous bridges, several sanitation projects, including pumping stations, settlement tanks and pipe runs financed through taxation, which also vastly increased due to the efficiency of the serais.

Puppet palaces, ports and railways

Eager to complete the illusion of a self-governing Iraqi nation, and buoyantly confident from the spoils of oil, the British sought an alternative to the RAF's bombs by commissioning a suitable collection of architectural monuments more aligned with 'prestige'. These buildings were to venture beyond the PWD's skeletal efficiency, beginning with a palace for the new Monarch (Fig. 16). Although J. M. Wilson had resigned from the Iraqi PWD, he retained a friendship with Arnold Wilson who was now director of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company and consequently received numerous building commissions for the Company in Iran, and was willingly re-employed in Iraq to design the palace along with an array of other monumental works.[106]

The palace attempted locally to legitimise the King and to boost his credentials. It was also a move towards developing a sense of permanence upon which Iraqi identity might ripen. Located on the

banks of the Tigris in Baghdad, the design reflects the political *modus operandi*; from the outside it was quasi-Arab, from the inside, distinctly British. The perspective drawings of the interior courtyards reveal the scale and ambition of the project, which was built from local bricks. A language of symmetry, strong axis, exaggerated entrances on the scale of triumphal arches and restrained decoration was being formulated, as well as subtle, but scholarly references to Arab and Islamic decorative motifs (derived from archaeological findings). Internally it was something of a palatial club-meets-country residence, complete with billiard and drawing rooms embodying British notions of a royal domain. The intrigue of an Arabian palace stimulated considerable interest in the UK, and Wilson's exquisite rendered perspectives were consistently shown at Royal Academy exhibitions.[107]

Whilst Baghdad had the cultural institutions and ceremonial seat of power, the economic engine of Iraq was Basra, and it too required its own kind of palace of commerce in the form of the Port Directorate Offices (figs 17, 18). Here the British wanted to demonstrate the rapid transformation of the town, justifying their presence as well as attempting to instil notions of collective pride through exaggerated and imposing buildings. The old PWD loggia and colonnade motifs were still present and formed the bulk of the composition but with the addition of a vast central domed hall. The building signified the importance of the port and the desire to develop a waterfront that represented British Imperial ambition, as well as creating a suitable base from which shipping and military presence in the region could be extended. The celebratory and exaggerated

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Figure 16. Perspective
drawing of Proposed
Palace for King Feisal by
J. M. Wilson (courtesy of
Wilson Mason LLP).

scale of the building was not lost on the Colonial Office which noted that it was: 'beyond the present requirements of the country and the standard of its trade' and fallaciously claimed that 'it is a legacy of the British military occupation'.[108]

Concerned about public scrutiny it was quick to justify the expense: 'It has not come as a gift from the British Government, but the administration has been temporarily transferred to Iraq, which … is to repay to the British Government the full estimated value of the port, Rs. 72,19,000 [about £538,000] by annual instalments'.[109] The development of these large projects clearly benefited British trade. Shipping was made more efficient and larger vessels from other nations would be attracted to the modern port facilities. Furthermore, British expertise was utilised along with British materials, contractors and machines—and all of the costs were to be fully repaid.

The docks, railway (and even to some extent road projects[110]) were elevated way beyond their functional pragmatic requirements to become something of celebratory prestige and 'identity' works. The Port offices were reaching an international shipping audience, fulfilling Basra's desire to become the major port of the Gulf, whereas the monumental railway station at Baghdad was at once completing a project that Germany had failed to deliver before

Figure 17. Perspective
drawing of the Interior
of Port Offices, Basra by
J. M. Wilson (courtesy of
Wilson Mason LLP).

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Figure 18. Front
elevation of the Basra
Port Offices (The
National Archives, CO
1069-674-1).

the First World War and serving as celebratory monument to the thousands of miles of transport infrastructure. Despite not being completed until after the Second World War, it clung onto an architectural approach of the 1920s, a clear tribute to Lutyens' Viceroy's palace in New Delhi. But here the Viceroy is absent, replaced instead with railway engines, tracks, logistics and the demagoguery of trade.

Taste, style, decoration

Faisal lived just long enough to see Iraqi Sovereignty won in 1932, but many of the previous military and

oil concessions made to Britain remained in place, as well as the PWD structure which continued to design prisons and other such buildings.[111] The later incumbent, King Ghazi, lacked his father's tribal experience and rapport with his subjects, and this was somewhat reflected in Mason's design of his new palace, spurning regional references and decoration. In this post-Mandate period he was searching for an approach that was free from Wilson's late-Empire style and the somewhat monotonous PWD creed of his previous work, which veered between a 'self-effacing classicism and a neo-Islamic style, neither carried out with particular conviction' (figs 19, 20).[112] For Ghazi he proposed a kind of fantasy romantic abode known as the Palace of Flowers.[113]

This rather eccentric building, bursting with whimsical curlicues, can be positioned within a broader context of colonial housing types and is indicative of the 'colonisation of taste' (Fig. 21).[114] The dwelling is arranged according to conventional Metropolitan upper-class modes of living with rooms allocated to specific functions such as 'dining', with associated furniture and artefacts.[115] It was elaborate, decadent and playful, but at the stub of imperial extravagance it stretched the divide ever further between the ruled and the rulers. Even pro-British Iraqi architects castigated and sought to distance themselves from this approach, instead seeking a 'modern' architecture that would reflect the flourishing economic status and growing political confidence of the territory.[116]

These opposing design principles did not get in the way of practice, and Wilson and Mason set up business together in 1935, dominating building design in the region for two decades. Their first commissions in Iraq were civil airports at Baghdad and Basra. The Basra airport was positioned on the banks of the Shatt Al Arab to cater for sea planes and Wilson produced one of his seductive renderings to illustrate the proposal (Fig. 22).[117] Fulfilling the realisation to make Iraq the 'junction of a great system of converging air and railway routes by which Asia and Europe will exchange passengers, mails and valuable goods'[118] it was finally built just before the outbreak of the Second World War and published in the UK architectural journals.[119] Rather like the Port Offices and Railway Station, the airports were able to transform mere infrastructure into aspirational identity.

Resembling an aeroplane when viewed from the air, at ground level its use of local bricks and earth floors, albeit arranged in a slightly clunky form, appeased a growing interest in indigenous building techniques by newly trained Iraqi architects.[120] Built for prestige and the growing numbers of oil company visitors, its spacious interior looked to Europe for the latest in glamour and luxury, equipped with an observation platform, a cocktail bar of glass and chrome, and a generous barrel-vaulted hall that was equally rakish (figs 23, 24). Despite their civilian role, the airports retained the 'two faces of nation-building' for the Iraqis, standing as stark reminders of the RAF presence and Iraqi exposure to foreign military power. Indeed, Basra airport was completed just in time to be used as a military base for the Second World

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Figure 19. Royal
College of Medicine,
Baghdad, H. C. Mason
(from *The Book of the
Liverpool School of
Architecture* , 1932).

Figure 20. Royal
Agricultural Society,
Baghdad, H. C. Mason
(from *The Book of the
Liverpool School of
Architecture* , 1932).

War, and with India winning its Independence shortly after the War, its days as an international hub of Empire were short lived. The British reoccu-

pied Iraq during the War to reinstate the monarchy following the 1941 coup and, with the signing of a new Anglo-Iraqi treaty in 1948, maintained a sig-

Figure 21. The Villa
Harathiyah or 'Palace of
Flowers' (*The Builder*,
February, 1935).

nificant presence there. Oil profits stimulated a
banking office boom, including the Rafidain Bank
by Philip Hirst and the Estate Bank by Henning
and Chitty.[121] The 1948 treaty secured a British
involvement for a further twenty-five years and
prompted the re-planning of Mosul, Baghdad and
Basra—plans that were thwarted by the coup of
1958, the burning of the Residency and the final
departure of the British.[122]

Concluding remarks

All building represents and embodies something of
the power structures, economy and cultural
expression of its makers—even more so when it
is produced as an explicit manifestation of the
state. Building and infrastructure form the nodes
and channels for exchange and encounter; they
foster connections, lessen the differences that
large distances once upheld, and are used as

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Figure 22. Perspective
of Basra Airport
(courtesy of Wilson
Mason LLP).

both containers and expressions of memories and narratives. It was these projects that offered a greater sense of collectivity and belonging than the overt attempts at forcing such a bond through 'prestige' projects. Despite this, the railways, docklands, bridges, roads and serais eventually held this cachet—transitioning from mere functional solutions to elaborate palaces of trade and expressions of British presence. The British presence in Iraq, whilst brief compared with the extended periods of occupation and settlement elsewhere, occurred at a time of increased international scrutiny, as well as great flux in how Britain viewed its increasingly fraught overseas dealings. Yet through this fractured and fleeting encounter we can observe a number of transitions relating to the creation, expression and embodiment of state and nation, accompanied by their various architectural manifestations.

It is difficult to think about nation, nationality and state as fixed or even coherent. These concepts need to be viewed over time, and if rendered somewhat simplistically, four concurrent episodes of British occupation and expressions of state and nation can be distilled. The first phase encompassed the capture of the territory from another party, a 'land-grab' and 'right-of-conquest' approach. This was a quest further complicated through the involvement of a third party, itself another colony within a broader imperial network. The capture of Basra could only be delivered with the assistance of this additional foreign presence: deployed as sweepers, labourers and proposed settlers. In this phase new towns were rapidly planned and coastal supply chains established to cement and retain the presence. The territory was seen as a void ready to be developed and restored, governed as a province of India. Post-war this was unacceptable, yet an

Figure 23. The Lounge,
Basra Airport (*The
Builder*, February,
1935).

international coalition awarded the territory to
Britain with a proviso, or mandate, that this arbi-
trary portion of land was to be rendered a new
nation-state, and at some future date externally
validated as capable of governing itself. In addition
to enforcing law and administrative functions, a
programme of 'improvements' commenced for irri-
gation, road, rail and docklands. The state was
being constructed according to the occupiers'
vision, but without being attached to the grass
roots.

Recognising the paucity of this approach, 'phase
two' looked towards justifying foreign presence by
'alternative legitimacies' of antiquity and mythology,
coupled with the more quantitative (yet equally con-
trived) tasks of cartography and census.[123] Here
archaeological finds were uncovered, 'preserved',
catalogued and mapped. Exhumed objects were

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Figure 24. The Bar,
Basra Airport (*The
Builder*, February,
1935).

now presented as artefacts in purpose-built
museums and collections, helping to preserve
certain narratives whilst forgetting others. The
story of these finds was created to inform the
present, coupled with the data extracted on
current settlements, sanitation and living arrange-
ments. The production of the map enabled these
groups to be plotted within associated territories,
and taxation expediently extracted. The newly

created University, decorated with ancient motifs
and references, also formed part of this historical
re-enactment, as well as providing the training for
future leaders fully acclimatised to the colonisers'
view of the territory, its people and its past.

It was an approach that was fiercely contested,
unintentionally creating a unity amongst the dispa-
rate groups of 'Iraqis' in their rebellion. Appeals to
the local populations followed in the production of

the serai buildings, forming the third stage of British intervention. Frequently built in areas of unrest, the serais dispensed Ottoman administrative procedures, and were also deployed to pacify local population groups through devolved power and a policy of sectarian staffing recruitment. The architecture of the serais was also modified to appease these groups, with grander structures giving the impression of greater regionalised powers—regardless of what was actually offered. The serais were also used to counter the blunt effects of the RAF's bombing missions: attempting to coerce compliance and build localised allegiances and power structures.

A further veneer of a local authority was applied in a fourth stage of occupation, recruiting a monarch and eventually designing an associated palace. The palace was part of creating an 'authentic' King, expressing his dynastic heritage and attempting to present him as a figurehead for a disparate group of nations within the state. The grandiose architecture of the palace was replicated in other monuments to trade, such as the port offices and railway terminus. It was a flamboyant architecture utilising local trades and materials, whilst adopting an imperial scale beyond any functional requirements. Suggestive of success, permanence and validity, these works were an attempt to stimulate a nationalist pride in the local populations. With the passing of Faisal, the influence of the monarchy dwindled to ceremonial roles, and an immiscibility between the state and the nation(s) endured, heightened by the implausible Ghazi palace and the international glamour of airports fuelled by oil revenue and replicating European taste. Despite these attempts at shaping the nation, and the several evol-

ving forms of representing and expressing it, the nations within could never accept an external occupation. However, the external presence, in part, helped to forge a common identity (if only in opposition) and eventually cemented the territory as a nation state, leaving only the task of internal identity building and competing visions for the state to resolve upon Britain's departure.

In its quest to contribute to our understanding of 'global architecture', this paper has attempted to integrate political context along with built projects, somewhat sidestepping the formal debate in deference to a broader discussion of the procurement and power struggles surrounding such commissions. 'Infrastructure' must also feature alongside grandiose interventions. Sanitation projects, transport networks and the patterns and flows of trade must be carefully braided into the story, alongside the transnational movements of labour, expertise and products. Iraq is an important crucible for such debates, and for how we continue to develop a more global approach to architectural history.

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Notes and references

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granting permission to reproduce J.M. Wilson's watercolour paintings.

2. The territory was previously part of the Ottoman Empire, and known as Mesopotamia. Mesopotamia was the Greek name for the region between the Euphrates and Tigris rivers, and was the name used by the British when referring to that area, as well as the wider region. With the boundaries established by the Mandate, the territory became known by its Arabic name of Iraq. In this paper both names are used to reflect the period under discussion.

3. Talentino offers a concise definition of nation and state: 'a nation is a distinctive group of people who feel a communal bond … while a state is a political actor defined by territorial borders, political organisation, and recognised legitimacy'; Andrea Kathryn Talentino, 'The Two Faces of Nation-Building: Developing Function and Identity', *Cambridge Review of International Affairs,* 17 (2004), pp. 557–75; 559.

4. Geog Simmel, 'Metropolis and Mental Life', in *Cities and Society: The Revised Reader in Urban Sociology*, Paul K Hatt, ed. (New York, Free Press, 1957), pp. 635–46; 644.

5. Michael Mann, *States, War and Capitalism: Studies in Political Sociology* (Oxford, Blackwell, 1988), p. 1.

6. Toby Dodge, *Inventing Iraq* (New York, Columbia, 2003), p. XXV

7. Andrea Kathryn Talentino, 'The Two Faces of Nation-Building, *op. cit.*, pp. 557–75.

8. K Sultani, 'Architecture in Iraq between the Two World Wars, 1920–1940', *UR, International Magazine of Arab Culture; London Iraqi Cultural Centre* (1982), pp. 93–105. Mark Crinson, *Modern Architecture and the End of Empire* (Aldershot, Ashgate, 2003); 'Abadan: Planning and Architecture under the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company', *Planning Perspectives,* 12 (1997), pp. 341–59.

9. Caecilia Pieri, *Baghdad Arts Deco: Architectural Brickwork, 1920–1950* (Cairo, American University in Cairo Press, 2010).

10. See also Magnus T. Bernhardsson, 'Visions of Iraq: Modernizing the Past in 1950s Baghdad' and Panayiota I. Pyla, 'Baghdad's Urban Restructuring, 1958', in *Modernism and the Middle East: Architecture and Politics in the Twentieth Century*, Sandy Isenstadt, Kishwar Rizvi, eds (Seattle, University of Washington Press, 2011); Robert Saliba, *Urban Design in the Arab World* (Farnham, Ashgate, 2015).

11. Allawi's daughter recently published his biography: Jihan Allawi, *The Works of Ja'far Allawi: A Pioneer of Iraqi Architecture* (Amazon Digital Services, 2012).

12. Łukasz Stanek (2012), *Miastoprojekt goes abroad: the transfer of architectural labour from socialist Poland to Iraq (1958–1989)*, *The Journal of Architecture*, 17:3 (June, 2012), pp. 361–386. See also Vladimir Kulić, 'Building the Non-Aligned Babel: Babylon Hotel in Baghdad and Mobile Design in the Global Cold War', *ABE Journal*, 6 (2014), [consulted 17/09/15]; URL: http://abe.revues.org/924 ; DOI: 10.4000/abe.924

13. More recent global surveys are making significant efforts to include lesser-known architectures and architects, but even the epic *A World History of Architecture*, M. Fazio, M. Moffett, L .Wodehouse, eds (London, Laurence King Publishing, 2009) merely mentions Iraq in the introduction to a chapter predictably entitled 'Islamic Architecture'; *A Global History of Architecture,* F. Ching, M. Jarzombek, V. Prakash, eds (Hoboken, NJ, John Wiley & Sons, 2007) goes much further, including several references, but nothing beyond 1600AD. *Architecture The Whole Story* (London, Thames & Hudson, 2014) does not include any reference to Iraq, presumably because it is yet to feature in that story. Kathleen James-Chakraborty, 'Beyond Postcolonialism: New Directions for

the History of Nonwestern Architecture', *Frontiers of Architectural Research,* 3 (2014), pp. 1–9, offers a review of global historiography, as does Swatti Chattapadhyay's recent review of 'global' history, further demonstrating the prevailing bias and research focus that dominates the field: see Swati Chattopadhyay, 'The Globality of Architectural History', *Journal of the Society of Architectural Historians,* 74 (December, 2015), pp. 411–15.

14. See Abdul Amir Amin, *British Interests in the Persian Gulf* (Leiden, E. J. Brill, 1967) and M. E. Yapp, 'The Establishment of the East India Company Residency at Baghdād, 1798–1806', *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies,* 30 (1967), pp. 323–36.

15. See David Fraser, *The Short Cut to India: the record of a journey along the route of the Baghdad Railway* (Edinburgh, Blackwood, 1909).

16. Edward Ingram, *Empire Building and Empire Builders* (London, Cass, 1995).

17. Stephen Hemsley Longrigg, *Iraq, 1900 to 1950: A Political, Social, and Economic History* (London, Oxford University Press, 1953), p. 53.

18. William Willcocks, *The Irrigation of Mesopotamia* (London, Spon and Chamberlain, 1911). Willcocks also worked on various civil engineering projects in India, Egypt and South Africa having trained at the prestigious Thomason College of Civil Engineering in Roorkee, India.

19. See Naval Intelligence Division, *Iraq and the Persian Gulf* (London, HMSO, 1944), p. 269; Edith and E. F. Penrose, *Iraq: International Relations and National Development* (London, Ernest Benn, 1978), pp. 16–17.

20. *Ibid.*

21. The British Government was a major shareholder in the Anglo Persian Oil Company and the Navy had recently decided to replace coal-fired engines with oil power.

22. The Rupee was adopted during the First World War when Indian forces took Basra. Within one week Indian civil police replaced military police and an Indian justice system was applied. See Briton Cooper Busch, *Britain, India, and the Arabs, 1914–1921* (Berkeley, Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1971), p. 50.

23. Meadows went on to become chief architect to the municipality of Singapore: see *The Singapore Free Press and Mercantile Advertiser* (2nd July, 1924), p. 8. He was also the Author of *Modern Eastern Bungalows, and how to build them* (Calcutta, Thakar's Press, 1931).

24. *The Architects' Journal*, 'Town Planning Scheme for City of Basra' (3rd September, 1919), pp. 291–297; 292.

25. *Ibid.*, p. 292.

26. *Ibid.*

27. *Ibid.*, p. 297.

28. F. T. H. Wood, 'Civil Sanitary Work in Mesopotamia', *Public Health* (July, 1920), pp. 159–164; 164. This survey and census technique was also borrowed from India and the sanitation practices developed by the likes of W. J. R. Simpson, *Report of the Health Officer of the Town of Calcutta for 1886* (Calcutta, Municipal Printing Press, 1887). For further discussion, see Richard Harris, Robert Lewis, 'Colonial Anxiety Counted: Plague and Census in Bombay and Calcutta, 1901', in *Imperial Contagions*, Robert Peckham, David M. Pomfret, eds (Hong Kong, Hong Kong University Press, 2013), pp. 61–80.

29. Stephen Legg, 'Foucault's Population Geographies: Classifications, Biopolitics and Governmental Spaces', *Space and Place,* 11 (2005), pp. 137–56; 145.

30. Arjun Appadurai, 'Number in the Colonial Imagination', in *Orientalism and the Postcolonial Predicament*, Carol A. Breckenridge, Peter van der Veer, eds (Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press, 1993), pp. 314–40.

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31. F. T. H. Wood, 'Civil Sanitary Work in Mesopotamia', *op. cit.*, pp. 159–164; 163.

32. *Ibid*, p. 163.

33. Colonel C. E. Yates, http://hansard.millbanksystems. com/commons/1915/jul/21/class-ii#S5CV0073P0_ 19150721_HOC_317

34. G. L. Beer, *African Questions at the Paris Peace Conference* (New York, Macmillan Company, 1923), p. 417.

35. Arnold Wilson, *Loyalties: Mesopotamic 1914–17*, Vol. 1 (London, Oxford University Press, 1936), p. 154.

36. Thomas R. Metcalf, *Imperial Connections: India in the Indian Ocean Area, 1860–1920* (London, University of California Press, 2007), p. 101.

37. Radhika Singha, 'Finding Labor from India for the War in Iraq: The Jail Porter and Labor Corps 1916–1920', *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, Vol. 49, number 2 (2007), pp. 412–445.

38. Briton Cooper Busch, *Britain, India, and the Arabs, 1914-1921*, *op. cit.*, pp. 54–55.

39. J. E. Shuckbrurgh, 'Employment of Japanese Troops in Mesopotamia' (13th December, 1917), pp. 2–3 (Political Department, India Office, British Library, IOR/L/ MIL/17/15/78).

40. The Sykes-Picot agreement was established by Britain and France between November, 1915, and March, 1916, to determine how to divide the territory upon defeating the Ottomans, and set provisional national boundaries for Iraq and Syria. Mark Sykes' papers are available online at http://www.britishonlinearchives. co.uk/

41. See, *inter alia*, George Buchanan, *The Tragedy of Mesopotamia* (Edinburgh, London, Blackwood and Sons, 1938); Briton Cooper Busch, *Britain, India, and the Arabs, 1914–1921*, *op. cit.;* Stephen Hemsley Longrigg, *Iraq, 1900 to 1950, op. cit.*

42. Stephen Hemsley Longrigg, *Iraq, 1900 to 1950, op. cit.*, p. 34.

43. George Buchanan, *The Tragedy of Mesopotamia*, *op. cit.*, pp. 51–52.

44. George Buchanan, 'Reports on (1) the Conservancy of the Shatt-el-Arab river from the Port of Basra to the Persian Gulf and on (2) the Development of the Port of Basra. By Sir George Buchanan Kt., C.I.E' [10v] (24/62) (British Library: India Office Records and Private Papers, IOR/L/PS/20/C149) and in *Qatar Digital Library* <http://www.qdl.qa/en/archive/81055/ vdc_100023622758.0×00001a> [accessed 29/07/ 15], p. 18.

45. *Ibid.*, p. 18.

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47. *Ibid*., p. 73.

48. See Priya Satia, 'Developing Iraq: Britain, India and the Redemption of Empire and Technology in the First World War', *Past and Present* (November, 2007), pp. 211–55 for more on the notions of Edenic restoration and redemption.

49. M Barnett, 'Nation Building's New Face', *Foreign Policy* (2002), pp. 98–99.

50. 'The conquest of Baghdad', *Country Life*, v.41 (17th March, 1917), pp. 247–250. The capture of Baghdad was filmed and is available to view here: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5opyrNysZt8

51. R. H. A. Jones, 'Mesopotamian Architecture', *The Architect* (1922), pp. 460–62; 460.

52. *Ibid.*

53. *Ibid.*, p. 461.

54. G. L. Beer, *African Questions at the Paris Peace Conference*, *op. cit.*, p. 424.

55. See Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, rev. edn (London, Verso, 1991), p. 187 for discussions

on the colonial penchant for adding the prefix 'new' to an existing settlement's name.

56. Percival Phillips, *Mesopotamia, the "Daily Mail" Inquiry at Baghdad* (London, Associated Newspapers, 1922), p. 28.

57. *Ibid*.

58. *Ibid*.

59. G. Buchanan, 'The Development of Mesopotamia: I. Exaggerated Hopes, An Orgy of Waste', *The Times* (23rd September, 1919), p. 9.

60. Arnold Wilson, 'Mesopotamia', *Journal of the Royal Central Asian* Society, 8:3 (1921), pp. 144–161; 151.

61. G. L. Beer, *African Questions at the Paris Peace Conference*, *op. cit.*, p. 424.

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63. Stephen Hemsley Longrigg, *Iraq, 1900 to 1950, op. cit.*, p. 108.

64. Director of works was to be paid between £2,400-2,700 per annum (The National Archives, Kew, UK, 8th May 1920 T161/7 Baghdad–Directorate of Public Works).

65. He was articled to Thomas M. Cappon, then worked for Thomas and Wilkie before joining James Gibson (1861–1951) of Gibson and Gordon when he moved to London. See C. H. Lindsey Smith, *JM: The story of an architect* (Plymouth, Clarke, Doble and Brendon, 1976), pp. 2–3.

66. *Ibid*., p. 4.

67. See Letter from Gertrude Bell to her father, 19th November, 1922 (Gertrude Bell Archive, Newcastle University, http://www.gerty.ncl.ac.uk)

68. See Peter Scriver, 'Empire-Building and Thinking in the Public Works Department of British India', in *Colonial Modernities: Building, Dwelling and Architecture in British India and Ceylon*, Peter Scriver, V Prakash, eds (Abingdon:, Routledge, 2007), pp. 69–92.

69. Priya Satia,'Developing Iraq: Britain, India and the Redemption of Empire and Technology in the First World War', *Past and Present*, no.197 (November, 2007), pp. 211–255; 231.

70. Colonial Office, 'Iraq. The Report of the High Commissioner on the Development of Iraq 1920–1925' (London, Colonial Office, HMSO, 1925), p. 36.

71. Mark Crinson, 'The Building with a Shadow: National Identity and the International Style', in *Nationalism and Architecture*, Raymond Quek, Darren Deane, Sarah Butler, eds (Farnham, Ashgate, 2012), pp. 115–34; 116.

72. Colonial Office, 'Iraq. The Report of the High Commissioner on the Development of 'Iraq 1920–1925', *op. cit.*, p. 37.

73. Toby Dodge, *Inventing Iraq*, *op. cit.*, p. XXV.

74. Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London, Verso, 1991), p. 181.

75. See Caecilia Pieri, *Baghdad Arts Deco*, *op. cit*., p. 33. The project was also covered in 'Theological College, University of Al Il Beit, Baghdad', *The Architect and Building News,* 117 (24th June, 1927), pp. 1048–49. The Campus was eventually used to house the Mausoleum of Faisel. Google Earth reveals that the theological college is still standing.

76. Quoted in K Sultani, 'Architecture in Iraq between the Two World Wars, 1920–1940', *UR, International Magazine of Arab Culture; London Iraqi Cultural Centre* (1982), pp. 93–105; 101.

77. Caecilia Pieri, *Baghdad Arts Deco*, *op. cit*., p. 35.

78. Toby Dodge, *Inventing Iraq*, *op. cit.*, p. XXVI.

79. The National Archives, Kew, UK, *Candidates for the Emirate of Mesopotamia*, FO 141/444/7.

80. The National Archives, Kew, UK, *Movements of Emir Feisal following his anti-French activities,* FO 141/439/6.

81. The serai plans included in this paper were traced by the Author from examples included in the PWD report written by A. S. Clay, *Iraq Administrative Report of the*

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Public Works Department for the years, 1924, 1925, 1926 and 1927 (Baghdad, Government Press, 1928). In addition to the plans shown here others were included for bungalows and schools.

82. See Tania Sengupta, 'Between the Garden and the Bazaar: The Visions, Spaces and Structures of Colonial Towns in Nineteenth-Century Provincial Bengal', *Visual Culture in Britain*, 12:3 (2011), pp. 333–348; Tania Sengupta, 'Producing the Province: Colonial Governance and Spatial Cultures in District Headquarter Towns of Eastern India, 1786–c.1900' (unpublished PhD Dissertation, University of Westminster, 2011).

83. Rajika Bhandari, *The Raj on the move: story of the dak bungalow* (New Delhi, Lotus Collection, 2012).

84. Colonial Office, 'Iraq. The Report of the High Commissioner on the Development of 'Iraq 1920–1925', *op. cit.*, p. 39.

85. *Ibid*.

86. Priya Satia, 'Developing Iraq, *op. cit.*, pp. 211–55; 220.

87. The capture of the town from Isis demonstrates the strategic significance it possesses to this day: see 'The Fall of Ramadi Is a Sign of Defeat for Isis', *The Independent* (28th December, 2015), http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/the-fall-of-ramadi-is-a-significant-defeat-for-isis-a6788896.html [accessed 18/01/16].

88. See Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, 'The British Occupation of Mesopotamia, 1914–1922', *Journal of Strategic Studies*, 30:2 (2007), pp. 349–377.

89. Liora Lukitz, 'Iraq: the search for national identity' (London, Frank Cass, 1995), p. 33.

90. Mohammed M. A. Ahmed, *Iraqi Kurds and Nation-Building* (New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2012).

91. Toby Dodge, *Inventing Iraq*, *op. cit.*, p. 134.

92. 'Iraq. Report of the financial mission appointed by the Secretary of State for the Colonies to enquire into the financial position and prospects of the government of Iraq, 1925' (HMSO, Cmd 2438), p. 7.

93. Letter from Gertrude Bell to her father, 29th April, 1925 (Gertrude Bell Archive, Newcastle University, http://www.gerty.ncl.ac.uk)

94. 'Iraq. Report of the financial mission appointed by the Secretary of State for the Colonies to enquire into the financial position and prospects of the government of Iraq, 1925' (HMSO, Cmd 2438), p. 7.

95. *Ibid.*, p. 40.

96. A. S. Clay, *Iraq Administrative Report of the Public Works Department for the years, 1924, 1925, 1926 and 1927* (Baghdad, Government Press, 1928), p. 1.

97. Mason studied at the Liverpool School of Architecture, 1909–1911, and at the Royal Academy whilst working as an assistant for C.H.B. Quennell. After active service in India and the Middle East he joined the PWD in Iraq. See obituaries in *The Builder*, v198 (15th January, 1960), p. 133 and the *RIBA Journal*, v67 (March, 1960), p, 185 as well as, Mark Crinson, *Modern Architecture and the End of Empire*, *op. cit.*, p. 29.

98. See Clay, A. S, *Iraq Administrative Report of the Public Works Department for the years, 1924, 1925, 1926 and 1927* (Baghdad, Government Press, 1928), pp. 6–8.

99. Carter studied part-time at the Architectural Association and Royal Academy whilst articled to various practices. He was elected ARIBA in 1926 and immediately went to Iraq before returning the UK in 1931. See RIBA Library biographical file.

100. See A. S. Clay, *Iraq Administrative Report of the Public Works Department for the years, 1924, 1925, 1926 and 1927* (Baghdad, Government Press, 1928), p. 28.

101. *Ibid*.

102. Similar publications and guides were produced by the PWD in Nigeria, for example: see Ibiyemi Salami, *The Architecture of the Public Works Department in Nigeria during the early to mid twentieth century*

(unpublished PhD Dissertation, University of Liverpool, 2016).

103. See A. S. Clay, *Iraq Administrative Report of the Public Works Department for the years, 1924, 1925, 1926 and 1927* (Baghdad, Government Press, 1928), p. 10.

104. Toby Dodge, *Inventing Iraq*, *op. cit.*, p. XXIII.

105. See Jewish Telegraphic Agency (19th November, 1930), p. 12.

106. For an introduction to the APOC work, see Mark Crinson, 'Abadan: Planning and Architecture under the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company', *op. cit.*, pp. 341–59.

107. See, 'Memorial, the Fields, Persia R A Exhibition, by J. M. Wilson', *The Builder,* 135 (1928), p. 455; 'Hospital at Abadan, Persia for the Anglo-Persian Oil Co. R A Exhibition 1928 J.M Wilson', *The Builder,* 135 (1928), p. 475; 'Royal Palace, Baghdad for H. M. King Faisal, R A Exhibition, J. M. Wilson', *The Builder,* 135 (1928), p. 756; 'House in Abadan, Persia, R A Exhibition, J. M. Wilson', *The Builder,* 136 (1929), p. 954; 'Port Office, Basra, Iraq, J.M. Wilson R A Exhibition', *The Builder,* 137 (1929), p. 385.

108. Colonial Office, 'Iraq. The Report of the High Commissioner on the Development of Iraq 1920–1925' (London, Colonial Office, HMSO, 1925), p. 50.

109. *Ibid*.

110. See A. M Hamilton, *Road through Kurdistan: The narrative of an engineer in Iraq* (London, Faber, 1937).

111. Such as 'New Jail, Mosul, Iraq, by H. C. Mason', *The Builder,* 145 (1933), pp. 534, 546.

112. Mark Crinson, *Modern Architecture and the End of Empire*, *op. cit.*, p. 29.

113. See 'Villa Harathiyah', *The Builder*, v148 (8th February, 1935), pp. 270–273, 281.

114. Christopher Alan Bayly, *Rulers, Townsmen and Bazaars: North Indian Society in the Age of British Expansion, 1770–1870* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1983), p. 522.

115. J. M. Wilson and Gertrude Bell had previously helped to purchase furniture for Faisal, and there was a general deference to Western taste by the upper classes.

116. See comments made about the palace in J. A Allawi, 'A General Post Office, Baghdad' (unpublished Thesis Report 651A, University of Liverpool, 1939).

117. See also the news footage on http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=R-RDuM3hxz4 [accessed 06/03/16].

118. Colonial Office, 'Iraq. The Report of the High Commissioner on the Development of Iraq 1920-1925' (London, Colonial Office, HMSO, 1925), p. 51.

119. 'Terminal Building, Basrah Air Port, Iraq', *The Builder,* 153 (1937), p. 409.

120. See, for example, Mohamed Saleh Makiya, *The Arab Village* (Cairo, UNESCO, 1951).

121. See *Architectural Design* (March, 1957), p. 105 and *The Architects' Journal* (26th December, 1957), p. 976, respectively.

122. Max Lock was preparing plans for Basra; Mosul was planned by Raglan Squire; Spencely and Minoprio were planning Baghdad.

123. Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London, Verso, 1991), p. 181.